United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted on 9 June 2010, after recalling resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1887 (2009) concerning the topics of Iran and non-proliferation, the Council noted that Iran had failed to comply with previous Security Council resolutions concerning its nuclear program and imposed further sanctions on the country.
The resolution, which adopted a fourth round of sanctions against the country, was adopted by twelve votes for the resolution, two against from Brazil and Turkey, with one abstention from Lebanon. Resolution Observations
In the preamble of the resolution, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its provisions therein and obligations on parties to the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors had adopted a resolution stating that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and the Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction. There was concern that Iran had not yet fully suspended uranium enrichment activities, resumed co-operation with the IAEA or clarified issues relating to a possible military dimension to its nuclear program.
The Council recognised that access to diverse, reliable energy was critical for sustainable growth and development, and emphasised the rights of states in international trade. It called upon Iran to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and was determined to take appropriate measures to make Iran comply with provisions in previous Security Council resolutions and requirements of the IAEA. Acts
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council determined that the Iranian government had yet to meet the requirements of previous Security Council resolutions and IAEA requirements. It affirmed that Iran should immediately co-operate with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly with regards to activity at Qom, clarifications on a possible military use of the nuclear program and granting unrestricted access to all sites, persons, equipment and documents requested by the IAEA. The Council also decided that Iran should comply with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, not undertake any further reprocessing, heavy water-related or enrichment-related activities or acquire commercial interests in other states involving uranium mining or use of nuclear materials and technology.
Further provisions of the resolution included:
Iran could not participate in any activities related to ballistic missiles. A ban on all countries providing military vehicles, aircraft or warships and missiles or missile systems and related materiel to Iran; A ban on training, financing or assistance related to such arms and materiel and restraint over the sale of other arms and material to Iran; A travel ban on individuals listed in the annexes of the resolution, with exceptions decided by the Committee established in Resolution 1737; The freezing of funds and assets of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.
All states were furthermore recommended to undertake the following:
Inspect all cargo to and from Iran in accordance with the Convention on the Law of the Sea and civil aviation agreements for prohibited items and report within five days explanations for the search and the findings from such inspections; The seizure and disposal of prohibited items; Prevent the provision of fuel, supplies and servicing of Iranian vessels if they are involved in prohibited activities; Provide information to the Committee concerning attempts to evade the sanctions by Iran Air or Iran Shipping Lines to other companies; Prevent the provision of financial services that may be used for sensitive nuclear activities; Exercise vigilance when dealing with Iranian individuals or entities if such business could contribute to Iran's sensitive nuclear activities; Prohibit the opening of Iranian banks in their territory and prevent Iranian banks from entering into relationships with banks in their jurisdiction if there is reason to suspect the activities could contribute to sensitive proliferation activities in Iran; Prevent financial institutions operating in their territories from opening offices and accounts in Iran if they would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive activities.
Throughout the imposition of the aforementioned measures, exceptions were made for humanitarian purposes and legal economic activities.
The Security Council deplored the transfer of arms by Iran to other countries in violation of Resolution 1747 and directed the Committee to respond to violations and promote the implementation of previous resolutions. The Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon was requested to establish a panel consisting of up to eight experts for an initial period of one year to assist the Committee in its mandate; examine information presented by countries, particularly with regards to instances of non-compliance; make recommendations to the Council and report on its findings and recommendations.
All states were to report to the Committee within 60 days on the measures they had taken to implement the provisions of the current resolution. It emphasised diplomatic efforts by the five plus one (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) to resolve the nuclear issue and encouraged further efforts. It commended the Director-General of the IAEA Yukiya Amano for a draft agreement between France, Iran and Russia and requested a report within 90 days on whether Iran had begun co-operating with the IAEA and suspended activities mentioned in Resolution 1737. On the basis of the report, the Council would review the sanctions regime and would lift provisions if compliance was reported or consider further measures in the light of non-compliance with Security Council resolutions. Voting
The resolution was adopted after receiving 12 votes for the resolution, two against (Brazil and Turkey) and one abstention (Lebanon). Reactions Iran
Iranian PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad described the new resolution as a "used handkerchief which should be thrown in the dustbin". He also warned that the country would end negotiations on its nuclear program if the resolution was adopted.
In an e-mail interview to the British newspaper The Guardian, the Iranian reformist politician Mehdi Karroubi argued these sanctions would actually strengthen the Ahmadinejad regime by offering "an excuse to the Iranian government to suppress the opposition". Turkey and Brazil
Brazil and Turkey criticised the sanctions, saying they could undermine further diplomatic efforts. Brazil and Turkey had previously offered to mediate the dispute, an offer which was accepted by Iran.
“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and reaffirming their provisions,
“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
“Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran,
“Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
“Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,
“Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,
“Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,
“Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,
“Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,
“Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,
“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,
“Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,
“Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
“Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
“Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,
“Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
“Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,
“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,
“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
“Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,
“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);
“2. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
“3. Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;
“4. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;
“5. Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and notes that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement
“6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;
“7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;
“8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;
“9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
“10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
“11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
“12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”) individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“13. Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;
“14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
“15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
“16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;
“17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;
“18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;
“19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
“20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;
“21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
“22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
“23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“24. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“25. Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;
“26. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;
“27. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;
“28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;
“29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non‑compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;
“30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;
“31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;
“32. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;
“33. Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and encourages Iran to respond positively to such proposals;
“34. Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;
“35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution;
“36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
“37. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“38. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex I
Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Amin Industrial Complex: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).
A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company
2. Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.
3. Defense Technology and Science Research Center: Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees Iran’s defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.
Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
4. Doostan International Company: Doostan International Company (DICO) supplies elements to Iran’s ballistic missile program.
5. Farasakht Industries: Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.
6. First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities.
Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889 (Malaysia)
7. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4 of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St., Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran
8. M. Babaie Industries: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).
Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran
9. Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.
Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
10. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or related materiel.
Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
11. Mizan Machinery Manufacturing: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran
12. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.
13. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.
Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran
A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center
14. Pejman Industrial Services Corporation: Pejman Industrial Services Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran
15. Sabalan Company: Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.
19. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
20. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
21. Tiz Pars: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
22. Yazd Metallurgy Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd, Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
1. Fater (or Faater) Institute: Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC projects in Iran.
2. Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.
3. Ghorb Karbala: Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. Ghorb Nooh: Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA
5. Hara Company: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.
7. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8. Makin: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
9. Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
10. Oriental Oil Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
11. Rah Sahel: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. Rahab Engineering Institute: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. Sepanir: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. Sepasad Engineering Company: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
Resolution Annex III
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)
1. Irano Hind Shipping Company
Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran
2. IRISL Benelux NV
Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)
Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union
Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran
Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran
In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:
to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;
to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.
- Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
- Improving the six countries’ and the EU’s relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
- Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.
- Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
- Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
- Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
- Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.
Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.
Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.
- Support for agricultural development in Iran.
Facilitation of Iran’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.
- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
- Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
- Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.
Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues
- Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development and humanitarian need.
- Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
- Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
- Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.
- Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
- Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”.
- Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.
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The President Mr. Heller (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Khazaee (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Wittig (Germany) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.
The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/283, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I shall now give the floor to members of the Council wishing to make statements before the voting.
Mrs. Viotti (Brazil): Brazil will vote against the draft resolution. In doing so, we are honouring the purposes that inspired us in the efforts that resulted in the Tehran declaration of 17 May. We will do so because we do not see sanctions as an effective instrument in this case. Sanctions will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will play into the hands of those on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail. Past experiences in the United Nations, notably the case of Iraq, show that the spiral of sanctions, threats and isolation can result in tragic consequences.
We will vote against the draft resolution also because the adoption of sanctions at this juncture runs counter to the successful efforts of Brazil and Turkey to engage Iran in a negotiated solution with regard to its nuclear programme.
As Brazil has stated repeatedly, the Tehran declaration adopted on 17 May is a unique opportunity that should not be missed. It was approved by the highest levels of the Iranian leadership and endorsed by Iran’s parliament. The Tehran declaration promoted a solution that would ensure the full exercise of Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while providing full, verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme has exclusively peaceful purposes. We are firmly convinced that the only possible way to achieve this collective goal is to secure Iran’s cooperation through effective and action-oriented dialogue and negotiations.
The Tehran declaration showed that dialogue and persuasion can do more than punitive action. Its purpose and result were to build the confidence needed to address the whole set of aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. As we explained yesterday, the joint declaration removed political obstacles to the materialization of a proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency in October 2009. Many Governments and highly respected institutions and individuals have come to acknowledge its value as an important step to a broader discussion on the Iranian nuclear programme.
The Brazilian Government deeply regrets, therefore, that the joint declaration has neither received the political recognition it deserves nor been given the time it needs to bear fruit. Brazil considers it unnatural to rush to sanctions before the parties concerned can sit and talk about the implementation of the declaration. The Vienna Group’s replies to the Iranian letter of 24 May, which confirmed Iran’s commitment to the content of the declaration, were received just hours ago. No time has been given for Iran to react to the opinions of the Vienna Group, including to the proposal of a technical meeting to address details.
The adoption of sanctions in such circumstances sends the wrong signal to what could be the beginning of a constructive engagement in Vienna. Also of great concern was the way in which the permanent members, together with a country that is not a member of the Security Council, negotiated among themselves for months behind closed doors.
Brazil attaches the utmost importance to disarmament and non-proliferation, and our record in this domain is impeccable. We have also affirmed, and reaffirm now, the imperative for all nuclear activity to be conducted under the applicable safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Iran’s activities are no exception. We continue to believe that the Tehran declaration is sound policy and should be pursued. We hope that all parties involved will see the long-term wisdom of doing so.
In our view, the adoption of new sanctions by the Security Council will delay rather than accelerate or ensure progress in addressing the question. We should not miss the opportunity to start a process that can lead to a peaceful, negotiated solution to this question. The concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme raised today will not be resolved until dialogue begins. By adopting sanctions, this Council is actually opting for one of the two tracks that were supposed to run in parallel — in our opinion, the wrong one.
Mr. Apakan (Turkey): Turkey is fully committed to its responsibilities in the field of non-proliferation, and as such is a party to all major international non proliferation instruments and regimes. We do not want any country in our region to possess nuclear weapons. Such a development would make even more difficult the attainment of the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to which Turkey attaches great importance.
Turkey would like to see the restoration of confidence within the international community concerning the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. To that end, we see no viable alternative to a diplomatic and peaceful solution. It is in that understanding that, together with Brazil, we signed the Tehran declaration, which aims to implement the swap formula elaborated by the International Atomic Energy Agency in October last year with a view to providing nuclear fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor.
The Tehran declaration has created a new reality with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme. The declaration, which was designed as a confidence-building measure, would, if implemented, contribute to the resolution of the substantive issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in a positive and constructive atmosphere. The declaration in essence provides a first step in a broader road map that could lead to a comprehensive settlement of the problem. In other words, the Tehran declaration provides a new and important window of opportunity for diplomacy. Sufficient time and space should be allowed for its implementation. We are deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect the momentum created by the declaration and the overall diplomatic process.
On the other hand, it was rather unhelpful that the response of the Vienna Group was received only a few hours ago. The fact that the response was of a negative nature and that it was sent on the day of the adoption of the draft resolution on sanctions had a determining effect on our position. Our position demonstrates our commitment to the Tehran declaration and to diplomatic efforts.
That said, our vote against the draft resolution today should not be construed as reflecting indifference to the problems emanating from Iran’s nuclear programme. There are serious questions within the international community regarding the purpose and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and those need to be clarified. We take this opportunity to call upon Iran to show absolute transparency about its nuclear programme and to demonstrate full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to restore confidence.
Turkey attaches great importance to the resolution of this problem through peaceful means and negotiations. The draft resolution on sanctions will be adopted today despite our active and unrelenting efforts in that direction. However, the adoption of the draft resolution should not be seen as representing an end to diplomatic efforts. We are of the firm opinion that, after the adoption of the draft resolution, efforts to find a peaceful solution to this problem will have to be continued even more resolutely.
On the other hand, we take note of the concerns of the international community regarding the uranium enriched by Iran at 20 per cent. We expect the Iranian authorities to take steps to dispel the concerns of the international community, which reflect certain question marks regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We now expect Iran to work towards the implementation of the Tehran declaration. The declaration must stay on the table. Iran should come to the negotiating table with the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany to take up its nuclear programme, including the suspension of enrichment. We will contribute to that process.
With those considerations, the Republic of Turkey shall thus vote against the draft resolution today.
The President (spoke in Spanish): The Council will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution (S/2010/283) before it.
The President (spoke in Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1929 (2010).
I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.
Ms. Rice (United States of America): Today, the Security Council has responded decisively to the grave threat to international peace and security posed by Iran’s failure to live up to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Treaty is the principal international legal instrument for holding Member States accountable, discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons, and bringing the benefits of nuclear energy to all corners of the world. As President Obama has said, rules must be binding; violations must be punished; words must mean something.
The issue is straightforward. We are at this point because the Government of Iran has chosen clearly and wilfully to violate its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the resolutions of this Council. Despite consistent and long-standing demands by the international community, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment and other proliferation-related activities. The Security Council has passed a resolution today aimed at reinforcing the need for Iran to take these steps and comply with its obligations. These sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people, nor do they seek to stop Iran from the legitimate exercise of its rights under the NPT, in conformity with its obligations. Rather, the sanctions aim squarely at the nuclear ambitions of a Government that has chosen a path that will lead to increased isolation.
These sanctions are as tough as they are smart and precise. The resolution prohibits Iran from investing in sensitive nuclear activities abroad. It imposes binding new restrictions on Iran’s import of conventional arms. It bans all Iranian activities related to ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear weapon. It imposes a comprehensive framework of cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran’s smuggling and acquisition of illicit materials or nuclear items.
It creates important new tools to block Iran’s use of the international financial system, particularly Iranian banks, to fund and facilitate nuclear proliferation. It highlights the potential links between Iran’s energy sector and its nuclear ambitions. It targets the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran’s proliferation efforts. It establishes a United Nations panel of experts to help monitor and enforce the implementation of sanctions. And it imposes targeted new sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans, on 40 entities and an individual linked to Iranian nuclear proliferation.
Since 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to investigate serious concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme might have military dimensions. In 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed “grave concern” that Iran had still not enabled the IAEA to assure Member States that Iran had declared all of its nuclear material and activities. For our part, the United States launched a sustained and serious effort, starting early last year, to engage with Iran on a range of issues of mutual concern, including these nuclear issues. The United States has made detailed and specific openings to the Iranians, including personal and direct outreach by President Obama.
The United States strongly supports the peaceful use of the atom for energy and innovation. Like every nation, Iran has rights; but it also has responsibilities, and the two are inextricably linked. Iran has shunned opportunity after opportunity to allow verification of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In recent months, Iran has given us all more reason, not less, to suspect that its goal is to develop the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. Last September, the world learned that Iran had secretly built another uranium enrichment facility at Qom, in clear violation of Security Council resolutions and Iran’s IAEA obligations. Last November, Iran announced that it would build 10 more such facilities. In February, Iran said that it would begin to enrich uranium to nearly 20 per cent, moving closer to weapons-grade material. In May, the IAEA affirmed yet again that Iran is continuing its banned uranium enrichment, and warned that Iran has amassed more than 2,400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium.
The resolution we adopted today offers Iran a clear path towards the immediate suspension of these sanctions. The best way is also the easiest one. Iran must fulfil its international obligations, suspend its enrichment-related reprocessing and heavy-water-related activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA. The United States reaffirms our commitment to engage in robust, principled and creative diplomacy. We will remain ready to continue diplomacy with Iran and its leaders in order to make clear how much they have to gain from acting responsibly and how much more they stand to lose from continued recklessness. Today’s resolution does not replace those efforts, but it does support them.
Turkey and Brazil have worked hard to make progress on the Tehran Research Reactor proposal, efforts that reflect their leaders’ good intentions to address the Iranian people’s humanitarian needs while building more international confidence about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. My Government will continue to discuss the Iranian revised proposal and our concerns about it, as appropriate.
But the Tehran Research Reactor proposal, then and now, does not respond to the fundamental, well-founded and unanswered concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. Today’s resolution does. Until the world’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear defiance are fully resolved, we must work together to ensure that the sanctions in the resolution are fully and firmly implemented. We must ensure that the development of the most devastating weapons ever devised by human science is prescribed by the most responsible controls ever produced by human Government. Last month, 189 countries came together to strengthen the nuclear non proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone of global security. Today’s resolution is an important part of that work. The NPT must remain at the centre of our global effort to stop nuclear proliferation, even as we pursue the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
Today, I am proud to say that this Council has risen to its responsibilities. Now Iran should choose a wiser course.
Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by reading out the text of a statement that has been agreed on by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union. The statement reads as follows:
“We, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our determination and commitment to seek an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
“The adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), while reflecting the international community’s concern about the Iranian nuclear programme and reconfirming the need for Iran to comply with the United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors requirements, keeps the door open for continued engagement between the E3+3 and Iran. The aim of our efforts is to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy. We are resolute in continuing our work for this purpose. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in this regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor.
“We reaffirm our June 2008 proposals, which remain valid, as confirmed by resolution 1929 (2010). We believe these proposals provide a sound basis for future negotiations. We are prepared to continue dialogue and interaction with Iran in the context of implementing the understandings reached during the Geneva meeting of 1 October 2009. We have asked Baroness Ashton, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to pursue this with Mr. Saheed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, at the earliest opportunity.
“We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations.”
That concludes the statement on behalf of the six Foreign Ministers.
I should now like to make some remarks in my national capacity.
Today, the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010) as a result of the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme. Once again, the Security Council has sent a strong message of international resolve. It is a clear signal that Iran’s continued failure to comply with its Security Council and IAEA Board requirements to cease its enrichment-related activities cannot be tolerated.
The Security Council last addressed this issue in September 2008 in a clear statement that we wish to resolve our serious concerns through dialogue and negotiation (see S/PV.5984). Since that time, we have made several efforts to achieve that. When E3+3 Foreign Ministers met in New York on 23 September 2009 they reiterated their wish to negotiate a comprehensive long-term agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. But they also made clear that this could only be achieved if both sides were willing to approach these matters in a spirit of mutual respect and were committed to looking for solutions going forward.
At last October’s meeting in Geneva we reached agreement on three important issues. First, Iran agreed to hold a further meeting on its nuclear programme within one month. Iran also said that it would cooperate fully and immediately with the IAEA on the enrichment facility near Qom. It also agreed in principle to a deal to resupply its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).
We welcomed those commitments and made clear that we hoped that it would be the start of a period of intense negotiation. We regret that that did not prove to be the case. Iran has stated repeatedly that it will not discuss its nuclear programme, claiming that our concerns are baseless. They are not. They are fully documented in reports from the IAEA Director General going back several years and the subject of Security Council resolutions since 2006. The purpose of the facility at Qom remains unestablished. The February 2010 IAEA report made clear once again that Iran had not answered a number of key questions.
On the TRR, three days of talks in Vienna produced a detailed proposal from the IAEA that all parties present agreed. Iran then withdrew its initial acceptance of the TRR proposal and in February started to enrich low-enriched uranium to 20 per cent, despite having neither the need to do so nor the means to fabricate the fuel for use in the reactor. Iran also announced the construction of further enrichment facilities.
We acknowledge the good-faith efforts of Turkey and Brazil to persuade Iran to engage with the IAEA on the Tehran Research Reactor. However, we cannot accept Iran’s attempts to use these efforts to justify its continued defiance of successive Security Council resolutions that mandate a suspension of Iran’s enrichment operations. We have said many times that we do not question Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy. But with those rights come responsibilities.
Today’s resolution has been made necessary by Iran’s actions. Once again, the resolution restates our willingness to engage in dialogue to address the substance of our concerns. The measures adopted in this and previous resolutions can be suspended when Iran suspends its proscribed activities.
We remain ready to resume the talks on Iran’s nuclear programme that we started in Geneva on 1 October 2009. We believe that such talks can lead to a solution as long as they are purposeful, discuss both sides’ concerns and make swift progress. In extending our hand, we show our determination to resolve these matters through dialogue and diplomacy, and in adopting this resolution we show equal determination to continue to respond robustly to Iran’s refusal to comply with its international obligations.
Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010). The Council adopted it by a large majority, with the votes of countries of Africa, Asia, Europe and America, countries with or without a nuclear industry and countries with or without trade relations with Iran.
This unity has a clear reason, and all members know it. For 18 years, Iran has been developing a clandestine nuclear programme. Once that programme was discovered, Iran has unceasingly impeded the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover its objective. Iran continues to enrich uranium despite five Security Council resolutions and the lack of a credible nuclear power programme on its soil.
The facts are overwhelming; there is no room for doubt. It is sufficient to recall them. Iran has developed a programme for missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Iran has worked on advanced military studies that are the missing link between enrichment and the ballistic missile programme, in particular on building a delivery vehicle in which a nuclear warhead can be placed, while rejecting all cooperation on that issue with the Agency.
More recently, Iran has built a clandestine enrichment facility at Qom, adapted to military use but far too small for civilian use. That facility would have to function 24 hours a day for 45 years to provide fuel for a civilian reactor. Finally, in February Iran started to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent, which brings it even closer to a military threshold.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has concluded in its Director General’s report of 31 May that it was impossible for it to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
This, however, was not for lack of increased efforts to lead Iran, through dialogue, to prove its openness. Since 2003, the three European States — the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France — have been seeking to start a dialogue with Iran. That approach resulted in the first European cooperation proposal of August 2005, then the E3+3 proposal of 2006 and a new proposal of June 2008.
Significant incentives have been offered to Iran in the nuclear, security, commercial, agricultural and medical fields. A high-level delegation went to Tehran in June 2008 with a letter signed by the six Ministers, including the United States Secretary of State of that time. Countless meetings, ministerial exchanges and direct, indirect, multilateral and bilateral contacts took place with the Iranians. No effort was spared. However, those offers did not succeed, owing to the refusal of the Iranians to start negotiations, and for seven months Iran has refused to meet the European Union representative, Baroness Ashton, despite the commitment that it undertook last October.
In that context, my country gratefully welcomes the initiative of Turkey and Brazil on the Tehran Research Reactor as a confidence-building measure, and French authorities have indicated this at the highest level. We welcome the commitment of the two eminent leaders and wish them success. However, we note that Iran has already spared no effort to strip the agreement of its substance by continuing to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent and reaffirming its intention to continue to do so, which negates the main purpose of the agreement, and by playing for time to ensure that it would have to export only a fraction of its stockpile of uranium to enable it to rapidly rebuild the necessary quantity for a military device.
We have also noted Iran’s biased reading of the agreement, choosing to view it as a justification for unlimited enrichment, a definitive rejection of sanctions and IAEA inspections, and an alibi to avoid discussing its nuclear programme with the E3+3.
Finally and most importantly, a satisfactory agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor, which we sincerely hope to achieve, could be a useful confidence-building measure although it would not address the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, the discovery of the clandestine facility in Qom, enrichment to 20 per cent and Iran’s obstruction of the IAEA’s efforts. This problem remains unchanged, and Iran’s refusal to resolve it forces us to be firm today.
For these reasons, the sanctions resolution that we have just adopted is an appropriate response. The resolution is robust, yet specific and targeted. It is not aimed at the Iranian people. Its measures will increase the cost to Iran of its proliferation policy. They will slow down the progress of the nuclear programme and thereby give us more time for diplomacy. In fact, it was the very least we could do following the discovery of the clandestine facility in Qom and the beginning of enrichment to 20 per cent. It is our duty to protect the non-proliferation Treaty — a vessel that Iran believes it can board without a ticket.
If we did not react to such developments, the message we would send to potential followers of Iran would be: Go ahead. It is also our duty to prevent a regional arms race, which could be provoked by mere doubt concerning the aims of the Iranian programme. It is our duty, finally, to prevent a conflict leading to disastrous consequences in an unstable region.
That being said, the door of dialogue remains open. This includes discussions on the Tehran Research Reactor. Fully mindful of Brazil and Turkey’s efforts, France, the United States and Russia have written to the IAEA Director General to share with him the problematic issues raised by the Tehran agreement. We will propose an experts meeting with Iran as soon as possible to reach agreement on these issues. We are also ready to consider other confidence-building measures, as spelled out in the resolution that we have just adopted.
However, this is a decision that we cannot take alone. It is now up to Iranian leaders to take the hand offered to them, as we have urged them to do for nearly seven years. It is up to them to consider the interests of their people, rather than to pursue a dangerous dream of power at the cost of regional stability. It is up to them to choose integration into international society, reaping its dividends rather than the growing isolation to which they are condemning themselves. If they are ready for this, we will be there to help them.
Mr. Rugunda (Uganda): Uganda voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010) because we fully support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The resolution has a mechanism for review, including the suspension and removal of the measures imposed, provided that Iran complies with its obligations and the NPT. It is important that all nuclear activities of State parties to the NPT be verified for their compliance with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Agency has raised a number of issues in its reports regarding the Iranian nuclear programme that require clarification by Iran so as to assure the international community that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. Uganda commends and supports the diplomatic efforts of Brazil and Turkey that resulted in the Tehran declaration. We are convinced that such confidence-building initiatives are useful in the search for a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Uganda reiterates that it is important to continue all efforts towards a negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s inalienable right to develop its nuclear energy, while at the same time assuring the international community that its programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010) on the basis of its consistent principled position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. We have consistently advocated a resolution of all the international community’s questions concerning Iran’s nuclear programme through dialogue and constructive cooperation with Tehran.
We hope that Iran will view the resolution as a further signal of the need to respond positively to the numerous appeals of the E3+3 and the entire international community to fulfil its non-proliferation obligations and to launch substantial negotiations with the E3+3 to ensure full and transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to clarify all issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme.
Russia has made and will continue to make significant multilateral and independent efforts to convince Iran to cooperate constructively with the E3+3 and to fulfil in good faith all provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA decisions. In building the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia is reaffirming not just in words but in actions the fundamental right of Iran, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to develop a peaceful nuclear energy programme. Unfortunately, the intensive efforts of Russia and our partners in the E3+3 have yet to receive an appropriate response from Iran. Tehran has yet to take the decisions necessary to pave the way to its full enjoyment of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Under these conditions and in the context of the dual-path approach developed by the E3+3 and approved by the Security Council, it has become inevitable that additional restrictive measures should be adopted to constrain development in those Iranian activities that run counter to the task of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
The Security Council’s adoption of sanctions is a forced step, and we approach their use in a balanced and proportional way. During the negotiation of the resolution, Russian delegation’s efforts were targeted at ensuring that the Council’s decision aimed exclusively at bolstering the non-proliferation regime and contained no provision that would harm the well-being of the Iranian people.
We are firmly convinced that there is no alternative to a peaceful, diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. This postulate was reflected in the text of the resolution. We expect that Tehran will ultimately signal its full readiness to engage in negotiations with the E3+3. In the framework of such dialogue, the critical discussion of the Iranian nuclear programme would also address the E3+3’s proposed package of constructive incentives for our Iranian partners, in cooperation with the IAEA, to remove any lingering doubts about the programme. This package remains on the table, as reaffirmed by the resolution just adopted and the statement of the E3+3 Foreign Ministers at today’s meeting.
We are convinced that the contents of the package fully demonstrate the benefits to Iran of cooperation with the international community in various fields, which is impossible in the context of its disregard for Security Council resolutions and IAEA decisions on its nuclear programme. We hope that Iran will see these clear benefits and initiate cooperation with the E3+3, including in implementing all the understandings reached in Geneva on 1 October 2009. Clarifying the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through Tehran’s full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA could reverse the Security Council’s sanctions against the country and afford it the opportunity to fully exercise all the rights enjoyed by non-nuclear parties to the NPT, including to uranium enrichment for nuclear power plant fuel production.
We hope that the fuel-swap mechanism for the Tehran Research Reactor, which Russia originated, will be implemented. We welcome Brazil and Turkey’s efforts in that regard. Relevant work related to this initiative is continuing within the framework of the Vienna Group, with our active participation.
In conclusion, I should like again to underscore that we expect that Iran will act in a pragmatic and reasonable manner and respond positively to the six facilitators’ openness to dialogue to effectively resolve the Iranian nuclear issue in the interest of the entire international community.
Mr. Takasu (Japan): Japan voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010). I would like to explain the reasons for Japan’s support for this important resolution.
The Iranian nuclear issue has been a source of serious concern to the international community since Iran’s extensive nuclear activities were revealed in 2002. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council have been closely engaged and taken a series of decisions to resolve this issue of international concern. As a country strongly committed to the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Japan upholds the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It should be stressed, however, that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy entails the responsibility to comply with requirements and obligations under the relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions. The Council needs to squarely address the fact that Iran continues to violate its resolutions and fails to meet IAEA requirements.
The Tehran declaration on the exchange of Iranian low-enriched uranium and nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor would be a positive step if it were properly implemented. We pay tribute to the efforts of Brazil and Turkey to contribute to a diplomatic solution. However, this accord does not address the core issue of Iran’s obligations under Security Council resolutions. That is to say that Iran is obliged to suspend all enrichment-related activities until it fully satisfies and clarifies the international community’s concerns about the nuclear programme and thereby restores confidence. Even after the Tehran declaration, Iran continues to enrich and accumulate more low-enriched uranium, including activities to enrich up to 20 per cent, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The recent report of the IAEA Director General of 31 May once again states that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the IAEA to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful activities.
Japan supports the dual-track approach taken by the E3+3 group — and endorsed by the Security Council — to solve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and the necessary pressure, since resolution 1929 (2010) contains a firm but targeted and balanced message urging Iran to change its policy. Iran should intensify its cooperation with the IAEA to fully clarify outstanding and new issues in order to prove that its extensive nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran should also faithfully implement the decisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1929 (2010), so as to restore international trust and confidence.
Resolution 1929 (2010) is in line with the dual-track approach. In no way does it mean closing doors to continuing efforts to achieve diplomatic solutions through dialogue with Iran. I would like to underscore that the window for diplomatic efforts is open. Such thinking is well reflected in resolution 1929 (2010). On its part, Japan continues to seize every opportunity to urge Iran to take the strategic decision to seek a constructive solution to the nuclear issue.
Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): Austria voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010). A decision of this kind is never one to be taken lightly. From the time that Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials and activities were first confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in June 2003, Austria had hoped that the matter could be resolved through negotiation. Insufficient cooperation on the part of Iran led to the transmission of the issue to the Security Council in March 2006. Since that time, the Council has adopted a presidential statement and five resolutions. Regrettably, Iran has failed to address the core concerns of the international community and to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
Indeed, since the adoption of the last Council resolution in September 2008, the existence of a new undeclared enrichment facility has come to light and Iran has begun to enrich uranium to 20 per cent, to mention but two of the more recent developments. This is all the more unfortunate as last month the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) here in New York demonstrated a new constructive approach to non-proliferation issues. In the action plans adopted on that occasion, all NPT member States underscored, inter alia, the importance of cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency on questions of compliance.
As I indicated yesterday, Austria, in line with long-standing European Union policy, remains committed to the dual-track approach. In that context, we reiterate our call on Iran to take up the offer of talks with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in line with paragraph 33 of the resolution just adopted.
While we believe that the additional measures adopted today are necessary, we continue to stand behind the two major incentive packages put forward in June 2006 and June 2008. We hope that Iran will take up the offer of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the High Representative of the European Union, to resume dialogue on the nuclear issue without preconditions, with a view to seeking a comprehensive solution to this issue. In that context, I wish to highlight in particular the commitment contained in paragraph 37 of today’s resolution to suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome.
Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): The Security Council has just adopted a new resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue. This is the sixth resolution adopted by the Council on the matter since July 2006. Like the previous five, the new resolution not only reflects the concerns of the international community about the Iranian nuclear issue, but also expresses the aspiration of all parties to achieve an early and peaceful settlement of the issue through diplomatic negotiations. China calls on all members of the international community to implement the resolution comprehensively and in good faith. China has consistently maintained that the actions taken by the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue must adhere to the following three principles.
First, it should contribute to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran should strictly fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. In the meantime, its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be fully respected and safeguarded. Secondly, the Security Council’s actions should be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East, especially the Gulf region. Thirdly, it should help to promote the current momentum towards global economic recovery and not affect the day-to-day lives of the Iranian people or normal international trade and transactions.
The action taken by the Security Council should be appropriate, incremental, clearly targeted and commensurate with the actual practices of Iran in the nuclear field. It should reinforce diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.
China was earnestly and constructive engaged in the consultations on the draft resolution and worked vigorously to ensure that the text fully reflected the foregoing principles.
We are the view that sanctions can never fundamentally resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. To bring about a comprehensive and appropriate settlement of the issue, it is imperative to return to the track of dialogue and negotiation. The Security Council’s adoption of this new resolution does not mean that the door to diplomatic efforts is closed. The new resolution is aimed at bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and at activating a new round of diplomatic efforts.
To that end, the sanctions mentioned in the new resolution are reversible. In other words, if Iran suspends uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and complies with the relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council, the Council will suspend or even lift its sanctions against Iran.
It has always been China’s view that Security Council unity is essential to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. We have always maintained that the importance of the unity of the Security Council, and we are not in favour of hasty action. We believe that we must make a greater effort to maintain the unity of the Security Council.
Over the years, China has been committed to peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations and has made unremitting efforts in that regard. China welcomes and highly values the tripartite agreement between Brazil, Turkey and Iran on nuclear fuel exchange for the Tehran Research Reactor. We hope the parties concerned will make full use of the positive momentum created by the agreement and will spare no effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.
As the Security Council adopted its new resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue, the E3+3 Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to resolving the issue through diplomatic negotiations and expressing their readiness to redouble diplomatic efforts towards the resumption of negotiations. China hopes that the countries concerned will, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, strengthen contacts and dialogue, foster mutual trust, dispel misgivings, address one another’s concerns and seek a solution acceptable to all parties to restart negotiations.
China will work along with all countries concerned and continue to make its own contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means.
Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (spoke in Arabic): Lebanon was among the first countries to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is therefore important for Lebanon to reaffirm that the Treaty is extremely important in terms of the balance among and interdependence of its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For both Lebanon and the Arab States in general, the Treaty is the cornerstone of our response to the expectation of our peoples for a world free of nuclear weapons.
On behalf of the Arab Group, Lebanon reaffirmed this principle during last month’s NPT Review Conference in New York. There, the need to attain the universality of the Treaty was included among the core priorities of the international community. In line with our endeavour to attain the noble objective of freeing the entire world of nuclear weapons, our Arab peoples dream of the day when the people of the Middle East can enjoy living in a region free of nuclear weapons, as is the case with other regions and other peoples of the world.
In this regard, we stress the importance of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which reaffirms the call to transform the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons on the basis of the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to develop a mechanism for its implementation.
Israel is the only country in our region that possesses nuclear weapons. Israel should adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State and subject all of its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
It is very important for Lebanon to say that the approach to non-proliferation issues should be comprehensive and non-selective. However, a focus on nuclear non-proliferation should not overshadow the need to reaffirm the inherent and inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the rules and criteria established by the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as its comprehensive safeguards regime.
Thus, Lebanon believes that the understanding reflected in the Tehran declaration on enriched uranium — reached in May at the excellent initiative of Brazil and Turkey — is a significant step towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. My delegation has reaffirmed several times before the Council that the Tehran understanding provides an important opportunity that we should all seize and deal with in a positive manner.
Although that understanding did not have the necessary support and was not given enough time to yield the expected results, its elements still provide a gateway for the required process of confidence building. Even if the understanding does not dispel the doubts and respond to the questions of many Council members, the most effective response to any concerns or questions about the Iranian nuclear issue will come through further dialogue, not through sanctions. That is Lebanon’s firm and well-known position of principle.
My Government has studied the issue of today’s vote, and we have not at this time reached a final position. For that reason, Lebanon abstained. However, Lebanon believes, on the basis of its unwavering positions, which I have just recalled, that today’s new sanctions resolution is a sad setback for diplomatic efforts.
We refuse to give up in the face of this situation, and we call on all States, despite all the difficulties of this situation, to immediately resume and intensify international efforts, especially those of the E3+3. We appreciate all the efforts made by the E3+3 in recent years to reach, through responsible dialogue and due flexibility, a solution to all pending issues with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme on the basis of mutual respect, constructive cooperation and the right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to have access to nuclear energy and to develop the relevant technologies in accordance with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Mr. Onemola (Nigeria): Our vote this morning was informed by respect for our unwavering commitment to the ideals of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Adherence to the NPT does not preclude any country from optimizing its full use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; rather, it guarantees the inalienable right of parties to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT also remains the best framework for achieving disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Nigeria is pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme within the parameters of the NPT, including its safeguards agreement and additional protocol, in full cooperation and collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus, we recognize Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme.
Where, however, questions arise and evidence suggests that a country’s nuclear programme and activities are inconsistent with the provisions of the NPT, it becomes a matter of great concern to us. Having followed very carefully the discussions on Iran’s nuclear activities, Nigeria, like other countries, has been unable to fully understand whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely and strictly for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it is incumbent on Iran dispel the doubts that surround its nuclear activities. Specifically, we are convinced that Iran, as a State party to the NPT, has clearly violated its obligations under the Treaty. Furthermore, Nigeria does not understand Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA. We are also troubled by Iran’s failure to fully implement its safeguards agreement, including the additional protocol.
These worrisome failures have been compounded by the lack of clarity on the sudden spike in the building of nuclear sites, some of which were shrouded in secrecy. Moreover, the decision by Iran to enrich uranium to a higher level of 20 per cent and its insistence on continuing its enrichment programme raise genuine doubt about the real direction of its nuclear activities.
Notwithstanding our misgivings, we believe that a dual-track approach that combines pressure with intense political and diplomatic activities is the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear conundrum. We are satisfied that the resolution that we have just adopted recognizes this and commits all countries to pursue a dual-track approach regarding Iran. We welcome the explicit reaffirmation that outstanding issues can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls that the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran.
The emphasis on the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes gives hope that all the doors are not closed on Iran. In that regard, we applaud Brazil and Turkey for their exemplary initiative in signing with Iran at the highest political levels the joint Tehran declaration of 17 May 2010. We hope that it will still be possible to follow through on the joint declaration as a concrete confidence-building measure. Cooperation with the IAEA and the resumption of early dialogue with Baroness Ashton will give further impetus to a political settlement of the dispute.
Finally, I would like to echo the accent placed in the resolution on the fact that nothing compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of the resolution, including the use of force or the threat of use of force in responding to Iran. Satisfied with the intent of the resolution and the recognition of the need for continued political and diplomatic efforts, Nigeria voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010).
Mr. Barbalić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): I would like to stress once again that Bosnia and Herzegovina was among those who nourished the hope that the issue at stake could be resolved through negotiations and in a manner that would satisfy the concerns of all. However, we find ourselves confronted with further aggravation regarding a comprehensive solution to the issue of nuclear capacity development in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
As a State party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Bosnia and Herzegovina is fully committed to implementing the Treaty, which represents a unique and irreplaceable framework for the promotion of security and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. It is our strong belief that only full implementation of NPT safeguards agreements can ensure that nuclear energy is used in a safe and responsible manner. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the implementing agency remains the most reliable instrument to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Furthermore, we consider that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States is also important and must be fully respected and protected. Iran is no exception to that rule. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that the scope and objectives of any nuclear programme, including the Iranian programme, have to remain in accordance with the international rules and must be subjected to the verifiable and transparent inspection regime of the IAEA.
The Security Council has adopted resolutions calling on Iran to comply with the provisions of the NPT and to extend its full cooperation to IAEA inspections. However, according to the most recent reports, the international community did not get a clear and unequivocal answer from Iran, which has put the Security Council in the position of looking for additional measures to address this issue of utmost importance.
Bearing in mind the importance of restoring confidence in the strictly peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina urges Iran to comply with all resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and to implement the additional protocol. We firmly believe that a negotiated settlement, based on mutual trust and respect, is the best option. In that regard, we welcome the recent efforts by Turkey and Brazil as a significant confidence-building measure.
The resolution adopted today by the Security Council is tough. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the view that the resolution does not close the way to further diplomatic efforts and an ultimate negotiated solution. We believe that additional efforts and support from various parties could contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to readdressing the current situation and finding a satisfactory negotiated solution, which is our ultimate goal.
Therefore, once again, we call upon the parties directly involved to explore all possible means that could pave the way to a peaceful solution of this issue of particular importance. Such an undertaking would be beneficial first and foremost for the people of Iran and would open new avenues for cooperation between Iran and the international community.
The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.
Mexico is deeply commited to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We are concerned by any actions that could undermine the non-proliferation regime that the international community itself has adopted, particularly when they represent new threats to international peace and security in regions where tension, conflict and distrust among States prevail.
The case of Iran is not a new one for the Security Council, and unfortunately it is difficult to dissociate the debate on its controversial nuclear programme from its foreign policy pronouncements which run counter to the Charter of the United Nations and which give rise to concern and mistrust among a large portion of the international community.
The peaceful use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by a commitment — freely undertaken by each State — to respect the legal obligation not to carry out any activity related to a nuclear programme that has purposes other than peaceful ones. Iran must comply more transparently with the decisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responding to all requests for information on its nuclear programme. And Iran must also comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, with an express and above all verifiable renunciation of the possession of nuclear weapons. The Iranian Government must make every effort to redress the shortfall of confidence that a large portion of the international community feels with respect to the lack of transparency in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. This would unquestionably contribute to dialogue and cooperation as a way of resolving disputes in the region. It is Iran, not the Security Council, that must earn the trust of the international community.
We reaffirm the importance of continuing to deal with the Iranian nuclear case through dialogue and the importance of Iran continuing to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify pending questions about its nuclear programme in conformity with Security Council resolutions.
Today, we voted in favour of a resolution imposing sanctions on specific individuals and entities, sanctions that do not seek to harm the general population. These sanctions target nuclear proliferation activities and are completely reversible if the Government of Iran meets the requests of the Security Council. We urge the Government of Iran to meet those requests.
In our view, recent diplomatic initiatives on this matter are insufficient because they do not include a clear commitment to putting an end to nuclear-material enrichment activities and do not address the concerns of the international community. It is spurious to say that we are faced with an ultimatum or a dilemma between a peaceful solution and the use of force. In fact, after three rounds of sanctions, the path of dialogue with Iran remains open. A diplomatic solution is not incompatible with the adoption of sanctions, when the situation calls for it, and sanctions in no way close off dialogue and negotiation.
Mexico considers that the agreement we have reached is balanced. It puts greater pressure on Iran to fulfil its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while leaving open the path by which Iran can return to the negotiating table and reach a diplomatic outcome if it meets its obligations under Council resolutions and the NPT.
In that context, Mexico is convinced that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as emphasized at this year’s NPT Review Conference, should be part of a broader political understanding guaranteeing peaceful coexistence among the sovereign States of the region, including a future Palestinian State, and addressing the legitimate security concerns of those States.
In line with our pacifist outlook and our tradition of devotion to international law, we believe in the negotiated resolution of disputes. Mexico will continue to be committed to dialogue, peaceful means and the rejection of the use of force to resolve this issue.
I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.
I now invite the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Mr. Khazaee (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have never seen this Chamber as crowded as I see it today, so I must welcome all my colleagues who are here to watch this debate. It reminds me of the football game between the United States and Iran at the World Cup in 1998: the whole world was watching it.
Before entering this Chamber, I was refreshing my memory of history. History is indeed a wonderful instructor, especially when it follows us to this very moment. A wise man used to say that it is not history that repeats itself; it is we who repeat the same mistakes. A review of our bitter past memories, together with a close look at how this Council still acts today, proves that we are still dealing with a biased and unjust international system that is based on the hegemony of the most powerful.
In order to place them on record for the conscience of all peace-loving people around the world, I would like to say a few words about the unfair pressures that our nation has endured due to the aggression and intervention of some of the same countries whose representatives are sitting around this table today and are pushing for the imposition of more pressure against the Iranian nation. Let me talk about our own historical experiences.
This is not, of course, accidental or spontaneous. Comparisons in this case are amazingly instructive. The case that members of the Security Council have considered today has characteristics that are identical to those of the case against my country in 1951. The key words are quite similar: energy, independence and big-Power intervention. In the early 1950s, the United Kingdom was arguing exactly the same way as today, saying that “nationalization of Iran’s oil industry is putting in danger the peace and security of the region and the world”. Just replace the phrase “oil nationalization” from accusations against Iran at that time with today’s phrase “nuclear activities” and the result will be quite workable statements for diplomats who are repeating history.
It is worth remembering, however, that when Iran won the case regarding its oil nationalization in The Hague, the United Kingdom sold a trumped-up anti-communist story to President Eisenhower and a United States-led coup reinstated and supported the Shah’s dictatorship in Iran. Needless to say, the coup d’état was organized and implemented under the false pretext of maintaining international peace and security and respect for democracy and freedom — qualifications which were later used to justify many other, similar subversive actions against other developing nations in order to preserve or expand the interests of international cartels and consortia. The message was clear: No one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world.
Yet again, history will not forget the stark similarity and sharp contrast that exist between the efforts to impose anti-Iranian sanctions at the present time and those of the 1950s against the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. The stark similarity is that the axis of the United Kingdom and United States has been, at both times, at work to deprive the Iranian nation of its absolute right to achieve self sufficiency in energy production, whether through hydrocarbons or peaceful nuclear energy.
The difference, however, is that the Islamic Republic of Iran today is more powerful than ever, supported by its people — who now have three decades of political experience, a scientific and industrial renaissance and a rich cultural heritage — and enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of nations.
The hostile actions of these few Powers against our nation are not new. The United States and its allies even intervened on behalf of Saddam in his aggression against Iran, providing him with chemical weapons and other military support. That deadly support included increasing supplies of chemical and biological agents even after the first United Nations report was issued on the use of these lethal weapons by Saddam against civilian Kurds in northern Iraq and against Iranian troops. The first reaction of these Powers was to deny the accounts. The second reaction was to declare any response to the attacks to be premature. The third response was to sharply escalate the delivery of arms and chemical and biological agents. Again, no action was taken by the Security Council against this brutal use of chemical weapons because of the threat of veto by the very providers of these inhumane weapons. They are the same Powers that imposed this resolution on the Security Council today.
As soon as the United States saw that the victory of Iran was imminent in the war, it entered into direct confrontation with Iran by, among other things, shooting down an Iranian passenger aircraft. The inaction of the Security Council was again outrageous.
I will not dwell on the abuse of this body and the greatest lies of modern history articulated here by yet again the same Powers when they attempted to justify their invasion of Iraq. The United States and the United Kingdom again forged their own coalition and invaded Iraq under the false pretext of searching for weapons of mass destruction.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to exercise its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to build on its own scientific advances in developing various peaceful aspects of this technology. At the same time, as a victim of the use of weapons of mass destruction in the recent past, Iran has rejected and opposed the development and use of all such inhumane weapons on religious as well as security grounds. The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has on several occasions, including in his message to the Tehran international conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held in April 2010 in Tehran, declared that nuclear weapons are forbidden. I brought that message to the attention of this body in my letter circulated as document S/2010/203, in which he stated:
“We consider the use of such weapons as haram (religiously forbidden) and believe that it is everyone’s duty to make efforts to secure humanity against this great disaster.” (S/2010/203, annex, p. 4)
Furthermore, the presence and statement of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also underlined Iran’s fundamental rejection of nuclear weapons, as well as the need to strengthen and revitalize the non-proliferation Treaty. This is yet another indication of our great commitment to NPT issues and our concern about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the urgent need for their total eradication from the face of the Earth.
Iran indeed has maintained close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and indeed went even beyond its legal obligations in this cooperation. On many other occasions, I have already elaborated upon numerous examples of Iran’s robust cooperation with the Agency; here, I shall limit myself to saying that, since February 2003, the Agency has conducted over 4,500 person-days of inspections in Iran, which represent unprecedented verification activities in a State party since the creation of the Agency.
However, despite this unprecedented, robust and proactive cooperation with the IAEA, a few western countries continue their unfair and provocative behaviour and hostile attitudes against my country by getting the Security Council unnecessarily involved in this issue and pursuing such politically motivated resolutions. The Council has heard many false allegations against Iran, including that Lady Ashton was approached to meet with Mr. Jalili. I am not going to elaborate any further on that one.
A striking example of the lack of sincerity of those countries that make false accusations against Iran on the nuclear issue was manifest in connection with the deal on the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which was in fact put on the table after our request for the Agency’s assistance in purchasing 20 per cent-enriched fuel specifically for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical purposes for more than 800,000 cancer-affected patients. While we have proved our ability to enrich uranium to higher levels for the production of the fuel needed for the Tehran Reactor, we preferred, in a gesture of good will, to exchange our low-enriched fuel of 3.5 per cent for fuel enriched to the 20 per cent level needed for the Reactor. However, a few countries, in a miscalculated and politically motivated action, tabled a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2009, immediately following the discussion that we had in October. The same thing is happening here following Brazil and Turkey’s deal with Iran. Again, something has happened to thwart the goodwill of those countries, which I hope will not occur.
In addition to that, provocative remarks made by some American and European officials have raised serious suspicions among the Iranian people and officials regarding the American and European officials’ real intentions with respect to the uranium exchange proposal, damaged the atmosphere and deepened the sense of mistrust.
Despite this, we responded positively to the efforts of two members of the Council, Turkey and Brazil, which sincerely and at the highest level tried to pursue a deal that was actually what the Vienna Group had wished them to achieve. We displayed our good will and seriousness by agreeing to that initiative, which led to the Tehran declaration on the exchange of fuel. Here, I should like to express the gratitude of the Iranian Government and nation for the sincere efforts made by the Governments of Brazil and Turkey, which opened a new window of opportunity for further cooperation. But instead of welcoming the Tehran declaration, unfortunately — and to the great surprise of the international community, which had overwhelmingly supported the declaration — the same few Powers immediately introduced this politically motivated resolution.
Those who unfairly accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of a lack of cooperation are today showing no respect for what they initially encouraged these two members of the Council to do. This yet again highlights the bitter fact that what matters to these few Powers is their narrow political interests. It shows that they will break their promises whenever they so wish and that they have respect neither for other members of the Council nor for the pledges they have themselves made. What is at stake today is the credibility of the Security Council, which has been turned into a tool in the toolbox of a few countries that do not hesitate to abuse it when and where their interests require.
One day, there should be an end to the unrestrained and rampant application of double standards that is unfortunately being practiced by this Council. Some powerful members of the Council should provide answers to the many legitimate questions of international public opinion with regard to their behaviour in this Council. They should explain why they have incapacitated this body to react to the threats of resort to the use of force, and even of nuclear weapons, against Iran, uttered so vividly at the highest levels by the United States and as reflected in the United States Nuclear Posture Review, which exempts Iran from negative security assurances. They should respond to the question of why they have never allowed the Council to take any action with regard to the threats made on a daily basis by the criminal Israeli regime against Iran in violation of the United Nations Charter.
Indeed, they should also explain to the international community why they are pushing the Council to take action against a nation that is only trying to exercise its legal and inalienable rights, while at the same time the same few countries resort to every possible effort to prevent the Security Council from taking action against the Israeli regime’s violations of the most basic principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as documented by the Goldstone report (A/HRC/12/48), and have repeatedly prevented this body from moving to stop the massive aggression of the Zionist regime against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. There should be an answer on the part of those who prevented this body from adopting a strong resolution in condemnation of the massacre on board the freedom flotilla ship and forced the Council to limit its action to adopting a mere presidential statement on that grave, brutal and criminal act, which was a clear example of State terrorism. There should also be an answer as to why this Council has not been given the slightest chance to address the issue of the Israeli regime’s nuclear arsenal, despite its compulsive propensity to engage in aggression and carnage.
I wish to conclude by stressing that no amount of pressure or mischief will be able to break our nation’s determination to pursue and defend its legal and inalienable rights. Iran, as one of the most powerful and stable countries in the region, has never bowed and will never bow to the hostile actions and pressures of these few Powers, and will continue to defend its rights.
I have again to express my sincere thanks to the delegations of Turkey and Brazil for voting against today’s resolution, and to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon for not supporting it. History will commemorate those actions taken today in this Council.
The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to take the floor a second time.
Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I regret the need to rebut some of the comments made by the Permanent Representative of Iran, but his distorted account of history — including personal attacks on my country — simply demean him and seem designed as an excuse for Iran not to respond to international concerns about its nuclear programme.
The attacks on the integrity of the Security Council are an insult to my colleagues here now and over the past four years. I hope that, on more sober reflection, Iran will respond honestly to the concerns that are expressed in the resolution that has just been adopted and that have been expressed by this Council over the past four years on Iran’s nuclear programme, and that it will engage seriously in negotiations on that programme.
The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council will remain seized of the matter. ------ ...